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Abstract
Increasingly refugees live in urban areas—usually in slums 
impacted by unemployment, poverty, overcrowding and 
inadequate infrastructure. Host governments oft en restrict 
refugees’ access to the labor market, access that can be fur-
ther impeded by language barriers, arbitrary fees, and dis-
crimination. UNHCR and its partners are seldom equipped 
to understand and navigate the complex urban economic 
environment in order to create opportunities for refugees 
in these settings. Based on assessments undertaken in 
2010 and 2011 in Kampala, New Delhi and Johannesburg, 
research fi ndings indicate that refugees in urban areas 
adopt a variety of economic coping strategies, many of 
which place them at risk, and that new approaches and 
diff erent partnerships are needed for the design and imple-
mentation of economic programs. Th is paper presents fi nd-
ings from the assessments and lays out strategies to address 
the challenges confronting urban refugees’ ability to enter 
and compete in the labor market.
Résumé
De plus en plus, les réfugiés vivent dans les zones urbai-
nes, généralement dans des bidonvilles aff ectés par le chô-
mage, la pauvreté, la surpopulation et des infrastructures 
insuffi  santes. Les gouvernements qui les hébergent limitent 
souvent l’accès des réfugiés au marché du travail, alors 
que cet accès est en outre limité par la barrière de la lan-
gue, des frais arbitraires, et la discrimination. Le HCR et 
ses partenaires sont rarement à même de comprendre les 
environnements urbains complexes et de s’y orienter, dans 
le but de créer des opportunités pour les réfugiés vivant 
dans ces contextes. Basés sur des études en 2010 et 2011 à 
Kampala, New Delhi et Johannesburg, des travaux récents 
montrent que les réfugiés dans les zones urbaines utilisent 
une variété de stratégies de survie économique, dont plu-
sieurs sont risquées, et qu’il y a un besoin de développer 
de nouvelles approches et des partenariats diff érents, et de 
mettre en place des programmes économiques. Cet article 
présente les résultats de ces études et propose des stratégies 
répondant aux défi s auxquels sont confrontés les réfugiés 
urbains qui veulent entrer sur le marché du travail.
Introduction
Amongst the world’s burgeoning urban populations are 
refugees fl eeing confl ict and persecution. Escaping their 
own countries, they arrive in cities already collapsing under 
the weight of over-population, inadequate infrastructure 
and stretched public services. Th ese refugees arrive with 
little more than the clothes on their backs and crowd into 
the urban slums of developing world cities like Nairobi, 
Kampala, Johannesburg, Cairo and New Delhi. Th ere they 
seek out a means of survival alongside the host commun-
ity urban poor in neighborhoods plagued by high levels of 
unemployment, crime, sub-standard shelter, and oft en lim-
ited basic services—potable water, sanitation, garbage col-
lection and public transportation.
Refugees, like internal migrants, seek out urban areas for 
access to better health care, educational systems, and eco-
nomic opportunities.1 Some also seek the anonymity that 
large urban centers provide. Th ey may leave refugee camps 
for the urban areas or seek refuge in countries that do not 
utilize a camp-based model. Some refugees seek protection 
that they couldn’t fi nd in the camps; some come seeking 
access to other forms of humanitarian assistance and the 
possibility of third country resettlement.2
While fl eeing to cities is not new, what is new is that refu-
gees are migrating to urban areas in ever greater numbers.3 
According to UNHCR’s 2001 Statistical Yearbook, 13% 
of refugees were in urban areas, while the organization’s 
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most recent statistics state that 58% of all refugees are in 
urban areas.4 Th e urban refugee population in Kampala, for 
example, tripled between 2007and 2010,5 and they appear 
to be migrating ever-greater distances. One now fi nds 
Somalis in Hyderabad and New Delhi, India and Congolese 
in Johannesburg and Cape Town, South Africa. 80% of all 
refugees are hosted by developing nations and 42% reside 
in countries whose GDP per capita is below USD 3,000.6 
Such countries are ill-equipped to receive the refugees and 
are, more oft en than not, unable to keep pace with their 
own urban planning and development needs. Th e arriving 
refugees are seen to further contribute to rising crime rates, 
over-burdening public services, and competing for scarce 
jobs, housing and resources. Seldom are the refugees in 
urban areas viewed as potential assets who could contribute 
to economic stimulation and growth—fi lling both skilled 
and unskilled labor shortages and bringing in new skills 
and talents.
Th is paper details a qualitative, applied research initiative 
undertaken by the Women’s Refugee Commission focused 
on building the knowledge base on urban refugees and 
identifying potential economic strategies and approaches to 
assist them in achieving self-reliance. Th e project included 
fi eld assessments of urban refugee populations in Kampala, 
Uganda, Johannesburg, South Africa, and New Delhi, India 
conducted between September 2010 and April 2011. Th is 
paper highlights the fi ndings and suggests approaches 
focused on improving economic opportunities for urban 
refugees.
Methodology
Th is article is based on three fi eld assessments undertaken 
between September 2010 and April 2011 to Kampala, New 
Delhi and Johannesburg. Available background docu-
ments and research on each locale were reviewed prior to 
the assessments. Local organizations were partnered with 
on-the-ground organizations to facilitate access to the refu-
gee communities—the Refugee Law Project of Makerere 
University in Kampala, Don Bosco Ashayalam, a Catholic 
non-governmental organization in New Delhi, and the 
African Migration Studies Program at the University of 
Witwatersrand in Johannesburg.
Th e methodology employed was qualitative data collec-
tion that focused on the voices and direct experiences of 
the urban refugees. Each fi eld assessment included gender 
and age disaggregated focus group discussions. Th e focus 
groups were with refugee women, men and female and male 
youth; there were in-depth household interviews with all 
adult members of the household present (women, men and 
adult female and male youth), interviews of refugees who 
manage their own businesses, and with employers who hire 
refugees as well as with their refugee employees. A sampling 
of host country urban poor families was also interviewed 
for comparative purposes. In addition, the fi eld assessments 
included interviews of key stakeholders, such as the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and their NGO 
implementing partner staff , host government offi  cials, if 
appropriate, and development actors. NGO projects, host 
government services and refugee-run businesses were also 
visited, as were local markets to assess additional opportun-
ities and potential market barriers.
In Kampala, a total of 251 refugees were interviewed. 
Nine focus group discussions were facilitated (1 each with 
Congolese men, Congolese women, Congolese youth, a 
mixed male/female Congolese Village Savings and Loan 
Association, and a lesbian and gay refugee association from 
the Great Lakes), 3 with Somalis (men, women and youth), 
and a mixed adult male and female group from Burundi. In 
addition, twenty-four household interviews were completed 
(8 Burundi, 10 Congolese, and 6 Somalis) and 9 refugee 
businesses (2 Burundian, 5 Congolese, and 2 Somali) were 
visited and interviewed.
In New Delhi, 356 refugees were interviewed through 
thirteen focus group discussions (1 focus group each 
for ethnic Afghan males, ethnic Afghan females, ethnic 
Afghan community leaders, Somali males, Somali females, 
Somali community leaders, Hindu Sikh Afghan males, 
Hindu Sikh Afghan females, Burmese males, Burmese 
females, unaccompanied female minors, unaccompanied 
male minors, and a mixed sex group of refugee commun-
ity animators), as well as forty-eight household interviews 
(twelve per ethnicity), and fi ft een interviews with refugee-
run businesses.
Th e Johannesburg fi ndings are based on interviews with 
162 refugees, which include individuals, focus groups and 
businesses. Seventy-seven interviewees were women and 
adolescent girls and eighty-fi ve were men and adolescent 
boys. Data was also collected from extensive household 
surveys conducted by the African Centre for Migration 
and Society at the University of Witwatersrand. Th e fi rst, 
“African Cities” data set, includes 740 interviews with 
migrants and host community members in Johannesburg 
from 2006—2009 and looks at resilience and vulnerability 
due to generalized socio-economic conditions. Th e second, 
“vulnerabilities” data set, conducted in 2009, interviewed 
1,000 inner city and 1,000 Alexandra township residents, 
both migrants and host community, to compare vulnerabil-
ities and the impact of violence, harassment and exploita-
tion on livelihoods.7
Th e household interviews and focus group discussions 
emphasized qualitative data collection on refugees’ eco-
nomic coping strategies, income streams, major expenses, 
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access to assets and services, and protection risks. Th ree refu-
gee populations were targeted for inclusion at each assess-
ment site (Kampala: Congolese, Somalis and Burundians; 
New Delhi: Afghans, Burmese and Somalis; Johannesburg: 
Zimbabweans, Congolese and Somalis) to note diff erences in 
employment practices, the strength of social networks, and 
levels of vulnerability. Th rough purposive sampling, diff er-
ent wealth groups within each of the refugee nationalities 
targeted were included in the interviews and data collection. 
Th e wealth groups (very poor, poor, struggling, and better 
off ) were defi ned by the refugee community leaders who 
also assisted with their identifi cation. Th e “very poor”, for 
example, were characterized as those whose children were 
not in school, oft en eating only one meal per day, and living 
in a single room shared by large families or by more than 
one family, with no regular means of earning income. Th e 
“better off ” were those who had steady employment, regular 
income, lived in larger apartments (2 or more rooms), sent 
all their children to school—oft en private schools, accessed 
health care, as needed, and were able to eat three meals per 
day.
Cumulatively, the focus group discussions, household 
interviews, and interviews with refugee employees and 
refugee small business owners resulted in 160—350 refu-
gees being interviewed per site, with more than 700 refugees 
interviewed overall. Th e data gathered was triangulated 
(refugee data, service provider data and project site obser-
vation) to validate and improve data collection accuracy. 
Refugees participated throughout the process as interpret-
ers, interviewers and community informants.
Limitations
Qualitative research, while rich in content, is by design lim-
ited. Th is study is limited in scope and application due to its 
qualitative rather than quantifi able data. Wealth groupings 
were subjective based on the input of refugee leaders and 
local stakeholders. Refugee interviews, while based on pur-
posive sampling, were oft en limited to those selected who 
were available, locatable, and accessible in targeted neigh-
borhoods. In addition, focus group discussion participants 
can represent biases as they are oft en pre-selected by com-
munity leaders and service providers. As such, fi ndings are 
context-specifi c and unable to be generalized to other like-
settings. While this snapshot of the economic coping strat-
egies employed by urban refugees and the associated risks 
have knowledge application and potential programming 
implications for other urban refugee situations, care must 
be taken not to make assumptions about the direct trans-
fer of fi ndings to other urban areas. As noted, government 
policy, refugee’s pre-existing skill sets, and local market 
opportunities and constraints shape and infl uence what is 
possible in any urban location.
Background
More than 50% of all refugees now live in urban areas.8 In 
response to this changing reality, the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) revised its policy on 
urban refugees in 2009.9 Th e revised policy is more rights-
based and progressive than the 1997 policy10 it replaced. Th e 
1997 policy, deemed punitive by many refugee advocates, 
promoted an encampment policy and implied that refugees 
in urban areas were largely young men who had the resour-
ces to provide for themselves.11 Th e 2009 policy, on the 
other hand, advocates for freedom of movement, the right 
to live where one chooses including in cities, and access to 
livelihoods as fundamental to enhancing the urban protec-
tion environment.
Historically, under the 1997 policy, UNHCR focused 
primarily on the provision of protection in urban settings, 
rather than on service delivery. It was believed that refugees 
who made their way to cities had the means and skills to 
provide for themselves and required little outside assistance. 
Some deemed particularly vulnerable received subsistence 
allowance, usually for a limited amount of time until they 
could fi nd their own means of survival. Only as more was 
learned and as urban refugee populations continued to 
grow was there a recognition of the need to both revisit the 
policy and re-think the assistance eff orts. In fact, the lack 
of assistance and support that was the prime reason that 
nearly every study on urban refugee livelihoods observed 
negative coping strategies including crime, the use of vio-
lence and prostitution.12
Host government legislation and non-governmental 
organization (NGO) service provision, however, have not 
changed and adjusted in step with the revised UNHCR 
urban policy. Host governments oft en do not provide urban 
refugees with the right to work or even residence permits in 
order to facilitate the rental of apartments. In fact, UNHCR 
reports that of 214 countries reviewed, only 37% meet the 
international standards meaning that all necessary legis-
lation is enacted and enforced and that work permits are 
issued.13 In addition to these host government policy and 
legislative challenges, UNHCR and its implementing 
partners are struggling to identify and adopt new models 
for providing protection, access to basic services, and the 
promotion of self-reliance in urban areas. Th e complexity 
of urban socio-economic environments challenge even the 
most sophisticated of service providers including economic 
programmers. Compounding these challenges, refugees in 
urban areas are further marginalized from market access by 
language and cultural barriers and the lack of social capital. 
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Social networks, especially in developing countries, play a 
signifi cant role in securing jobs and accessing opportun-
ities.14 Without these local, indigenous networks, refugees 
risk remaining on the fringes of labor market.
As the growth in urban refugee numbers far out-strips 
a parallel growth in humanitarian fi nancial assistance 
and as the average length of displacement now extends to 
17 years,15 feeding and providing direct services to these 
populations is no longer a viable option. Th eir ability to 
provide for themselves not only enhances their protection 
by reducing, for example their need to trade sex for food, 
but, allows urban refugees to address their own needs with-
out substantive further assistance from the humanitarian 
community. Not only could economic opportunities restore 
some of the refugees’ dignity, allowing them to make deci-
sions about their expenditures and choices, promoting these 
opportunities would also allow humanitarian assistance to 
be used more eff ectively and sustainably—supporting local 
economic development or improving government health 
and education facilities rather than utilizing donor dollars 
to support food aid and refugee subsistence allowance. Th is 
model was tried in the Burundian refugee settlements in 
rural Tanzania in the 1960’s and 70’s to considerable suc-
cess. Refugees were allowed to self-settle and humanitarian 
assistance was used to build and rehabilitate roads, schools, 
and health clinics in the impacted region directly benefi t-
ting both the refugee and host communities rather than 
using the funds for direct refugee assistance.16 When host 
governments see direct benefi ts to them and their citizens, 
they are more likely to allow refugees to fully access their 
labor markets and their public services.
Understandably, in spite of obligations signed onto for 
those who have ratifi ed the 1951 Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees,17 most host governments are reluc-
tant to allow refugees to work. Th ey fear competition and 
worry that with jobs and income, refugees will de facto 
locally integrate, never to return to their countries of origin. 
While these concerns are valid, it is also true that refugees 
with cash in pocket and marketable skills are more likely 
to return home when such return is safe. Th is has been 
demonstrated repeatedly, Albanian Kosovars rushing back 
to Kosovo to repair their homes,18 the most highly skilled 
Southern Sudanese returning from the Kakuma camp in 
Kenya fi rst because they knew they could fi nd jobs,19 and 
the Liberians returning from Guinea to teach, farm, and re-
claim homes and properties in Monrovia.20 Oft en the resid-
ual refugee caseloads aren’t those who found ways to make 
money; but, rather those who did not, that is, those who had 
no resources to return with and no new skills that would 
make them marketable upon return an example being the 
residual caseload of Liberians residing in the Buduburam 
camp in Ghana.21
Specifi c Contexts
Th ree distinct contexts were chosen for this study on urban 
refugee livelihoods. Th e sites, selected in consultation with 
UNHCR staff , were chosen to refl ect geographic divers-
ity, diversity in host government policy and practice, and 
varying market opportunities and constraints. Th ree dif-
ferent refugee nationalities were assessed in each location 
and were selected based on size (the two largest groups in 
each location) and vulnerability (the group perceived by 
UNHCR and the local service providers as the most vul-
nerable).Th e cross-section of populations and geographic 
sites were assessed to provide opportunities for extrapola-
tion of lessons and synthesis of learning for potential global 
application.
Th e total number of refugees living in Kampala is 
unknown. UNHCR has registered over 35,000 urban refu-
gees,22 while Human Rights Watch estimates that there are 
over 50,000 refugees in Kampala.23 Th e largest refugees 
groups are the Congolese and Somalis and one-third of the 
urban refugees live on less and $1 (USD) a day.24 Kampala 
is a dusty, poor, congested city nestled amongst increasingly 
denuded rolling hills. Th e markets are under-developed 
and relatively stagnant. Unemployment is high even among 
highly educated Ugandans. Uganda is a signatory to the 
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 
1967 Protocol as well as to the 1969 Organization for African 
Unity Convention Governing the Aspects of the Refugee 
Problem in Africa—agreements that detail the rights of 
refugees. Uganda has also adopted national legislation in its 
2006 Refugee Law which allows refugees freedom of move-
ment and the right to settle in Kampala.25
In contrast, New Delhi is a bustling metropolis com-
prised of expressways, skyscrapers, a subway system, and a 
dynamic, expanding market. Jobs are plentiful albeit low-
end, entry level, unskilled positions. Th ere are over 21,000 
persons of concern to UNHCR in New Delhi representing 
15,269 refugees and 6,092 asylum seekers.26 Th e largest refu-
gee groups are Afghans and Burmese Chin who collectively 
represent over 90%of the refugee caseload.27 India is not a 
signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention or its Protocol 
and has not adopted domestic legislation governing refugee 
issues on their territory. As such, refugees fall under India’s 
Registration of Foreigners Act of 1939, the Foreigners Act of 
1946, and the Foreigners Order of 1948.28 Th e lack of a coher-
ent national policy framework has led to varied practices 
and diff erential treatment for the refugee groups hosted by 
India. While refugees do not have the right to work, they are 
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tolerated in the informal market where an estimated 92% of 
Indians also work.29
While there are no hard and fast numbers for refugees 
in South Africa, it is estimated that the number exceeds 
250,00030 a signifi cant percentage of whom are assumed 
to reside in and around Johannesburg. South Africa, the 
economic engine of southern Africa, is a destination for 
refugees as well as economic migrants. With no formal 
channels for migration, economic migrants apply for asy-
lum in order to remain in the country and clog the asylum 
system which negatively impacts those with legitimate asy-
lum claims.31 South Africa, however, is a signatory to the 
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the 1967 
Protocol, as well as the 1969 Organization of African Unity 
Convention Governing the Specifi c Aspects of the Refugee 
Problem in Africa. Further, South Africa enacted domestic 
legislation in its 1998 South Africa Refugee Act which grants 
asylum seekers and refugees freedom of movement, the 
right to work, and access to basic public services, such as 
health care and public education.32
Th e largest refugee groups in Johannesburg are the 
Zimbabweans, Congolese and Somalis and while historic-
ally refugees and migrants settled in the inner city to access 
markets, housing and public services, today most new arriv-
als settle in the informal settlements on the outskirts of the 
city.33 Th ese informal settlements are characterized by poor 
physical infrastructure, inadequate education and poor 
health outcomes.
Findings
Vulnerability
Vulnerability is not the same as poverty, marginalization, or 
other conceptualizations that identify groups or populations 
deemed to be disadvantaged, at risk, or in need. Poverty is a 
measure of current status; but, vulnerability involves a pre-
dictive quality. Th at is, it is a way of conceptualizing what 
may happen to an identifi able population under conditions 
of particular risks and hazards.34
According to Jacobsen, the context by which urban refu-
gees are exposed to vulnerabilities is predominantly “deter-
mined by the laws and policies of host governments and by 
the way these policies are implemented; the public and pri-
vate institutions devoted to supporting and managing refu-
gees, and the dominant public ethos towards refugees”.35 As 
noted throughout this article, host government policies and 
practices as well as xenophobia and discrimination by host 
country nationals have a signifi cant impact on both vulner-
ability and access to opportunity. While 144 governments 
are State Parties to the 1951 Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees;36 twenty governments have made reser-
vations to Article 17 of the Convention which is on the right 
to wage-earning employment.37 It is the practice, however, 
rather than the ratifi cation of international conventions or 
the adoption of domestic legislation, that most aff ects urban 
refugees’ vulnerability.
In all settings, vulnerability, defi ned as inclusive of pre-
diction of risks, varied, not unexpectedly, according to 
wealth groupings. Th ose categorized as “poor” and “very 
poor,” by far the largest percentage of all refugees in all three 
locations, lived precariously—locating themselves in mar-
ginal neighborhoods, shift ing apartments frequently, skip-
ping meals when they couldn’t aff ord food, accessing health 
services irregularly, and accumulating debt. Th eir income 
was erratic, infrequent, and unpredictable. Th eir children 
were oft en not attending school. Th ose deemed “better off ” 
resided in better, safer neighborhoods, had regular sources 
of income, were able to put food on the table three times per 
day, and their children not only attended school but oft en 
attended private schools. Th e “better off ’ refugees, however, 
were far fewer in number and, hence, represented a much 
smaller portion of the refugees interviewed. Th ose in the 
“struggling” category fell between the poor and better off  
groups; they had fairly steady sources of income although 
at low wages, decent if basic housing, and were able to meet 
their bills and aff ord basic necessities. Th eir children tended 
to attend government schools and they accessed health care. 
Th ey had no savings, however, and a shock or illness could 
quickly have them join the ranks of the poor or very poor.
Vulnerability also varied by nationality. In New Delhi, for 
example, the Burmese women, according to all key stake-
holders interviewed, are most aff ected by gender-based vio-
lence38 while the Burmese young males are most likely to 
be engaged in unsafe and exploitative labor practices. Th e 
Somalis, on the other hand, report the highest levels of dis-
crimination based on their skin color, dress and religion 
and the Somali female-headed households are among the 
most desperate oft en relying solely on UNHCR provided 
subsistence allowance to survive. Th e Afghans, especially 
the Hindu Sikh Afghans, fare best; living in better neigh-
borhoods, accessing steady employment and availing of 
services from their mutual assistance association which 
provides a range of social and educational services to their 
community.
In Kampala, paradoxically, the Somalis tend to fare bet-
ter than both the Congolese and Burundians. Th is largely 
has to do with their strong social networks and their prac-
tice of keeping money within their community. Th e Somalis 
in Kampala are concentrated in the central neighborhood 
of Kisenyi. Congregating themselves into a single, tight-
knit, economically well-positioned neighborhood serves to 
enhance their protection as well as facilitate the develop-
ment of their own businesses.39 Wealthier Somalis and the 
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mosques assist the most vulnerable members of the com-
munity, at times paying their rent and providing money for 
food. Somali women are somewhat protected by their limited 
movements and their tendency to stay within the confi nes 
of their own refugee community. Contrarily, the Congolese 
women engage in the riskiest livelihood activities, walking 
the neighborhoods throughout the city, going door-to-door 
to sell bitenge (the traditional Congolese cloth), jewelry and 
shoes exposing themselves to harassment, rape, theft , and 
arrest.40 Scattered in a number of neighborhoods through-
out the city, the Congolese social networks, while support-
ive, are more fragmented than those within the Somali 
community. Th e Congolese churches, for example, play a 
role in assisting the most vulnerable. Dozens of Congolese 
refugees live at the churches and the churches supply rice 
and other food assistance when they are able to those most 
in need. Less is known about the much smaller Burundian 
community except that their social networks are weak. Th ey 
are widely disbursed throughout the city, and that there are 
high levels of suspicion and mistrust within the community 
based on previous associations and potential acts commit-
ted during the genocide in Burundi.41
In South Africa, where gender-based violence (GBV) is 
endemic, GBV and xenophobia are considered by refugees 
to be major concerns aff ecting their vulnerability.42 Asylum 
seekers and refugee women are oft en targets of sexual vio-
lence and GBV was seen as the main threat to women and 
children during the 2008 xenophobic attacks.43 Th e threat 
of GBV can have major consequences for forced migrants’ 
economic activities and household incomes. Women say 
they risk sexual harassment and violence every time they 
sell goods on the street or in fl ea markets, go to work, or 
take public transportation, and they say they have little 
recourse or protection from this violence. Th ey report the 
police are indiff erent to their claims, and/or ask for bribes 
or sex in exchange for services.44
Th e Somalis tend to have stronger social networks in 
Johannesburg than the Congolese and Zimbabweans. Th ere 
are at least 60 Somali-owned and operated businesses and 
a Somali shopping mall in the Somali-impacted neighbor-
hood of Mayfair.45 However, a third of the Somalis inter-
viewed for a study conducted in 2010 lived in hostels and 
boarding houses, compared to 13% of other migrants.46 
Boarding houses charge by the day, which helps those with 
poor cash fl ow manage their day-to-day costs, but oft en 
means higher spending on housing in the aggregate and is 
indicative of economic vulnerability. Arbitrary evictions, 
police raids, exploitative landlords, and the lack of secure 
and aff ordable housing result in frequent moves among all 
refugee groups.
Resilience
Economic resilience refers to ingenuity and resourcefulness 
applied during or aft er an event.47 In the context of refu-
gees in urban areas, this resilience implies an ability to care 
for oneself and family, to somehow manage and survive 
against sometimes overwhelming odds. Th e economic cop-
ing strategies employed manifesting such resilience are not 
necessarily positive, safe or benefi cial. In fact, the coping 
strategies oft en include those that place refugees, particu-
larly women and youth, at high risk of abuse—engaging, for 
example, in transactional sex, exploitative labor practices, 
and illegal activities.
In spite, however, of the obstacles facing refugees in 
urban areas, the Women’s Refugee Commission’s research 
in the three target cities has found that majority of refugees 
to be coping and managing the complexity of survival in 
oft en hostile, unfamiliar environments. Not surprisingly, 
the “better off ” and “struggling” wealth groups managed 
better and had sources of income that were safer and more 
steady while the “poor” and “very poor” managed through 
risky, irregular work that was oft en accessed by fi erce deter-
mination—begging for day laborer work at construction 
sites, for example. Many refugee households managed by 
relying on multiple income streams coming in from work-
ing parents and older children in order to not only meet 
their basic needs for food, shelter and clothing but also to 
prepare them for unforeseen shocks and fi nancial stresses.48 
A handful of refugees in each location were actually thriv-
ing. Some of secured loans from host community members 
they had befriended and managed to open their own small 
businesses; a couple, despite the odds, were practicing their 
professions as doctors and teachers, while others managed 
to enroll and pay the fees for their children to attend private 
schools. For the most part, those who were making it in the 
city were doing so not because of any humanitarian assist-
ance provided but rather in spite of the lack of assistance 
given.
Refugees who migrate to urban areas tend, on the 
whole, to be more highly educated and more resourceful. 
In Kampala, for example, a study found that most of the 
urban refugees are educated urbanites—70% of the sample 
interviewed had either fi nished or been attending second-
ary education prior to fl ight and 30% had a college or uni-
versity qualifi cation. Many were academics, researchers, 
engineers, teachers and musicians.49 Self-selection oft en 
brings the most entrepreneurial and educated to the cit-
ies.50 Th ere they build and rely on their social networks for 
support. Th ey quickly learn and tap into all available ser-
vices and programs. Th ey advocate for themselves and are 
oft en relentless in seeking opportunities.
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In New Delhi, for example, many Burmese refugees fi nd 
work in small, irregular factories by going door-to-door 
to the factory owners pleading for jobs. When they are 
accepted into employment, they quickly bring in or refer 
their friends and family members to the same employer. 
Similarly, many Burmese youth work as caterers and servers 
at Indian weddings and functions and bring each other in to 
work collectively for the same catering companies. Within 
the Somali community in Kampala, established Somali 
businessmen hire Somali refugees who in turn provide food 
and fi nancial assistance to the most vulnerable within their 
refugee community. In these ways, the refugees are not only 
assisting their own but strengthening the resilience of their 
communities.
Access to Basic Services
Access to basic services for refugees living in urban areas 
is frequently impeded by host government policies which 
restrict health and education services to their own country 
nationals. Th ese restrictions oft en necessitate the creation 
of parallel, refugee-specifi c services for the urban refugee 
population, as full access to education, housing, employ-
ment and fi nancial services oft en requires documentation 
that is not always available to refugees, such as profes-
sional qualifi cation, school or banking records and birth 
certifi cates.51
Transportation costs also impede service access as costs 
to maneuver the wide expanses that comprise urban areas 
are oft en beyond the reach of many refugees. Th e major-
ity of refugees interviewed in the fi eld assessments report 
confi ning themselves within quite restricted districts of 
the metropolitan areas where they reside. Th ey oft en stay 
within their own neighborhoods both for protection and 
because they can’t aff ord to pay for bus, rickshaw, boda boda 
(for-hire motorcycles) and taxi fare. Th e fi nancially imposed 
restrictions on their movements further limit urban refu-
gees’ access to employment and basic services. In New 
Delhi, where traversing the immense, traffi  c-clogged city 
is particularly cumbersome, UNHCR’s non-governmental 
organization (NGO) partners have set up branch offi  ces in 
each of the major refugee-impacted neighborhoods thereby 
taking their services to the refugees instead of having the 
refugees travel long distances at signifi cant costs to reach 
them. In addition, UNHCR has negotiated refugee access to 
the Indian government-provided free education and health 
care systems. While less desired by the refugees than the 
previously accessed private schools and private hospitals 
that UNHCR subsidized, refugees now have access to pri-
mary and secondary education and health care on the same 
basis as the majority of Indians. Th is model of supporting 
access to host government services may require channeling 
international donor funding directly to host government 
health and education ministries.
Secondary education, while more widely available in 
urban areas than it is in many refugee camps, may be dif-
fi cult to access due to language barriers and work respon-
sibilities. As costs in urban areas are high and refugee fam-
ilies require multiple income streams to meet their monthly 
expenses, many refugee youth, especially male youth, work 
in the informal markets rather than attend school.52 Female 
youth, on the other hand, are more likely to stay home and 
assist with household chores and childcare responsibilities. 
Th ere are few opportunities for ‘earning and learning’ and 
even non-formal education classes tend to be off ered at 
times that clash with other work tasks.
In all locations, however, access to tertiary education 
whether university or vocational training, is problematic 
and costly, well beyond the means of most refugees. In New 
Delhi, refugees entering the university system, for example, 
are charged foreign student fees which are several times 
higher than the tuition fees paid by Indians. As urban refu-
gees are oft en highly educated, this can result in refugee 
young people ending up less educated than their parents.
Assets
While some refugees manage to fl ee with some of their assets 
intact, the majority does not and, as such, displacement is 
a time for economic practitioners to focus on building or 
re-building assets—social, human and fi nancial—in prep-
aration for an eventual durable solution. While there has 
been wide understanding of the importance of human and 
fi nancial capital, only recently has it become so apparent that 
the social networks in which people interact are integral to 
their livelihood development. Social capital is vital to help-
ing the poor manage risk and vulnerability.53 In fact, strong 
social networks/social capital proved to be the most valuable 
of assets for the refugees researched in the three Women’s 
Refugee Commission fi eld assessments. Social capital not 
only enhanced the refugees’ protection, whether living near 
each other or traveling together, but was the most vital source 
for information dissemination about NGO services, employ-
ment opportunities, and housing. In addition, refugees more 
frequently borrowed money from other refugees, when con-
fronted with emergencies and fi nancial shortfalls, than from 
any other source. Landau, in a 2011 article, premises that the 
primary determinants of eff ective protection have consider-
ably less to do with direct assistance than with individuals’ 
choices and positions in social and institutional networks.54 
In fact, a study further highlighting the importance of social 
capital examined the social capital impacts of BRAC micro-
fi nance programming in Bangladesh and found that the link-
ing of project participants to higher socioeconomic-standing 
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community members resulted in those among the most vul-
nerable moving up two economic class levels (out of a pos-
sible 5), moving from “vulnerable” to “middle class.”55
Human capital, especially educational attainment and 
previous work experience, had a generally positive impact 
on neighborhood of residence with more educated refu-
gees choosing more expensive, safer neighborhoods and 
higher quality shelter. However, the more highly educated 
oft en had more diffi  culties accessing the job market. While 
less educated, less skilled refugees were able and willing to 
secure employment in the informal labor market, the more 
highly educated were unwilling to perform unskilled labor 
and yet were not able, because of host government policies 
and the lack of recognition of their diplomas and certifi -
cations, to secure access in the better paid formal sector. 
Work in the informal markets in all three sites was oft en 
dangerous and, at times, exploitative. Th e Burmese Chin in 
New Delhi have, perhaps, the most diffi  cult adjustment as 
they come almost exclusively from rural, agricultural back-
grounds and, hence, the human capital they possess doesn’t 
match the needs of an urban, more structured employment 
environment. As such, they end up in unskilled, informal 
sector jobs that require them to work long hours for low pay. 
Th eir employers, while reporting that they are hardworking 
also state that they possess little employment etiquette; they 
tend not to call in when they’re sick, they generally do not 
give notice before leaving to accept another position, and 
simply do not show up for work when they have other press-
ing obligations like an appointment at UNHCR.56
Natural capital for refugees in urban areas is all but 
absent. Th ey are not allowed, in the contexts studied, to buy 
or own property and the three cities provide little in terms 
of access to open spaces or natural resources. Th e density 
of housing, for the most part, precludes access to even 
small plots of land for backyard gardening or the raising of 
small livestock. Th is is unfortunate as access to communal 
and public lands for crops and gardens could signifi cantly 
enhance urban refugees’ food security as well as provide an 
opportunity for those coming from rural backgrounds, like 
the Burmese, to utilize their existing skills. As urban agri-
culture becomes increasingly important for all urban popu-
lations, host governments will have to consider models for 
agricultural production closer to and in urban areas as a 
means of addressing their growing food security needs.
Physical capital, while part of the pull factor contributing 
to urban migration, can paradoxically also be a limiting fac-
tor in the neighborhoods where refugees reside. Inadequate 
shelter, poor roads, limited public transportation, and the 
lack of garbage collection, potable water, and sewage sys-
tems, may result in urban refugees living in squalor far worse 
than that in many refugee camps. Th e poor infrastructure 
can mean long travel times to reach basic services, lim-
ited access to markets, and increased exposure to health 
risks due to poor sanitation and over-crowding. Refugees 
in urban areas oft en move frequently whether because of 
inability to pay their rent, problems with their landlords, 
or harassment and protection concerns in their neighbor-
hoods. Th e frequency of moving from one apartment or 
shelter to another is a good indication of vulnerability with 
those most unstable in terms of residence tending to be the 
most vulnerable.57
Access to fi nancial capital is perhaps the biggest barrier 
urban refugees face in their quest to become self-reliant. 
Most cannot access formal banks for loans or for a safe 
place to save. In addition, micro-fi nance institutions (MFIs) 
are generally unwilling to loan to refugees because of their 
unstable living arrangements, lack of residence permits and 
lack of collateral. Some urban refugees have established 
informal rotating savings and loans associations within 
their communities but the loan amounts available tend to 
be too small to set up businesses. Some refugees, desper-
ate to access credit, borrow from local loan sharks, oft en at 
exorbitant interest rates potentially forcing them into a bur-
geoning cycle of debt.
A number of the refugees, particularly within the Somali 
community, receive remittances from relatives previously 
resettled to third countries.58 While helpful and even life-
sustaining for the most vulnerable, the remittances tend 
to be irregular and, hence, compound precarious living 
arrangements for the refugees who come to expect and rely 
on them. Remittances are rare within some of the refugee 
nationality groups such as the Burmese and Congolese. A 
fair number of Afghan refugees in New Delhi, though, 
report arriving with signifi cant savings or cash received 
from selling their properties inside Afghanistan while other 
Afghans continue to receive regular payments for rental of 
properties and homes owned back home.59
Th e Women’s Refugee Commission’s research found sur-
prisingly low levels of fi nancial literacy among the refugee 
populations studied including among those who were man-
aging their own small businesses. Household interviews 
undertaken as well as interviews with refugee-run busi-
nesses uncovered an almost complete lack of recordkeep-
ing of accounts by nearly all refugees. Most had little aware-
ness about their gross versus net profi ts and whether their 
income allowed them to meet their expenses. For the most 
part, the refugees’ expenses signifi cantly exceeded their 
income and many reported borrowing money at the end of 
the month to pay their rent and/or being several months in 
arrears on rent payments.
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Economic Coping Strategies
Economic coping strategies refer to the multitude of activ-
ities undertaken to meet basic survival needs—food, water, 
shelter, and potentially health and education. Economic 
coping strategies can be positive (safe, legal) or nega-
tive (dangerous, risky, detrimental to longer term health). 
Refugees in urban areas oft en undertake varied and mul-
tiple activities to secure income, shelter and food.
Th e economic coping strategies employed by the refugees 
in the three cities studied vary signifi cantly by nationality 
and by context as the opportunities and socio-economic 
environments diff er substantially. In every location, how-
ever, it is the informal, unregulated market that provides 
access while formal employment is severely restricted. In 
Johannesburg, where refugees can legally access employ-
ment, discrimination, xenophobia and high levels of compe-
tition impede access to the formal market while in Kampala, 
it is the limited opportunities and ad hoc manner that the 
work permit issue is interpreted that impedes access.60 
In New Delhi, refugees are offi  cially not allowed to work 
although employment in the informal sector is tolerated.
Th e economic coping strategies refugees are forced to 
employ can have a profound impact on child protection 
outcomes. Many of the most desperate refugees pull their 
children out of school to save even minimal amounts on 
school fees and related costs—uniforms, books, pencils—
and reduce the number of meals they eat per day to one, 
oft en consisting of little more than rice. In New Delhi, the 
Burmese Chin scour the night market for discarded vege-
tables, such as caulifl ower leaves, as supplemental food 
for their families. Th e market guards let them in to pick 
through the rubbish only aft er the cattle have fi rst been 
allowed in to eat their fi ll.
Th e primary means of income generation for the 
Congolese women in Kampala is selling bitenge (cloth from 
the Congo) and jewelry door-to-door whereas the Congolese 
men and male youth go from construction site to construc-
tion site trying to pick up daily work as laborers carrying 
bricks, mixing cement and shoveling mud.61 Th e smaller 
Burundian community in Kampala is more vulnerable and 
less organized. Some of them are rejected asylum seekers 
who are mixed in with the refugee population. A number 
are homeless and live in make-shift  cardboard shelters con-
structed in an alley behind the offi  ces of the Refugee Law 
Project. Begging, and sometimes criminal activity, report-
edly contributes to their means of survival.
Th e Somalis in both Kampala and Johannesburg, because 
of their strong social networks, oft en take care of their 
most vulnerable members with assistance for food and rent 
being provided by either the mosques or wealthier individ-
uals from the community. Th is is less true in New Delhi, 
where the community is much smaller and where perhaps 
the Somali transnational trade networks are less apparent. 
In addition, the Somali population in New Delhi includes 
a high number of female heads of household, most of who 
rely on subsistence allowance from UNHCR for their basic 
needs. In Kampala, where the Somalis feel particularly dis-
criminated against following the July 11, 2010 Al-Shabab 
bombings during the World Cup, they have a practice of 
supporting Somali-run businesses thereby keeping their 
money circulating within their own community—a prac-
tice not unlike that practiced by new migrant groups when 
they were trying to get established in the United States.
In New Delhi, while the Burmese, as noted above, are 
most likely to work in the irregular factories and as cater-
ers for Indian weddings, the Afghan men and a few of the 
women oft en work as interpreters at the high-end, private 
hospitals for wealthy Afghans fl ying in from Kabul to seek 
treatment oft en unavailable at home. A few from each com-
munity have established their own small businesses—kiosks, 
bakeries, and noodle shops. Some also work as domestic 
helpers in Indian and diplomatic staff  households and a 
signifi cant number participate in the UNHCR-supported 
income generation projects which are de facto subsidized 
employment or workfare.62
In Johannesburg, about 75% of forced migrants report 
being economically active and about 50% report having 
multiple, simultaneous livelihood strategies such as petty 
trading, casual labor or self-employment.63 Informal street 
commerce is the principle livelihood activity for both refu-
gees and the urban poor in Johannesburg. A few refugees 
have successfully employed micro-franchising schemes 
where they replicate their shops based in the city center as 
satellite shops in the informal settlements on the city out-
skirts with the manager of the micro-franchise paying a fee 
back to the owner to be part of the franchise.
Regardless of the economic coping strategies employed, 
the majority of urban refugees, while demonstrating a high 
level of resilience, remain on the fringes of the economies 
in which they live. For many their survival is day-to-day, 
hand-to-mouth subsistence joining the ranks of the urban 
poor. As Obi states, “unassisted refugees cannot be regarded 
as ‘self-reliant’ if they are living in conditions of abject pov-
erty, if they are obliged to engage in illicit activities in order 
top survive, or if they are obligated to survive on the remit-
tances or the charity of their compatriots.”64
Protection Risks
Protection is facilitated by legal recognition and documen-
tation, the realization of rights, such as freedom of move-
ment, the right to work, and the right to own land, and 
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access to justice and rule of law. Whenever any of these are 
compromised, the risks to protection increase.
Gender-based violence is a serious protection risk for refu-
gee women, girls, and to a lesser extent, boys in all three loca-
tions assessed. Th ese risks were oft en associated with their 
livelihood strategies as well as with their movement in the 
public sphere. Travel alone or aft er dark heightened females’ 
risk as did living in a household without an adult male. 
While gender-based violence was the most common protec-
tion concern, other types of violence were also reported. In 
post-apartheid South Africa, for example, violence against 
foreigners has been common and the ongoing threat of such 
against refugees and asylum seekers impacts their livelihood 
opportunities. Foreigners are six times more likely to than 
South Africans to have experienced threats of violence due 
to nationality or ethnicity65 and this violence escalated dur-
ing the xenophobic attacks that reached a crescendo in May 
2008 resulting in the large scale displacement of migrant and 
asylum seeking communities.
Th e lack of economic opportunities has also led many 
refugees to engage in transactional sex or turn to the com-
mercial sex as a means of support. In Kampala, a number of 
gay and lesbian refugees, ostracized by both the host com-
munity as well as their own community, report working 
as sex workers as they deem this the only viable livelihood 
option available to them.66 Th is option, though, is highly 
risky in the Ugandan anti-gay political environment which 
renders these sex workers at risk of arrest and detention, and 
their lack of legal protection limits their ability to demand 
payment from and negotiate safe sex with their clients.
Other protection risks include harassment, discrimina-
tion, unpaid wages, instability, precarious housing situations 
where landlords over-charge and evict tenants with little 
warning, theft  from homes and businesses, and police con-
fi scation of goods as well as police extortion and arrest.
Conclusion
Promoting an Enabling Environment
Creating economic opportunities for refugees in urban areas 
is a challenging and complex undertaking. Advocating for 
and infl uencing host government policy for recognition 
of refugee rights in policy and practice is a requisite fi rst 
step; identifying market opportunities and constraints and 
refugees’ economic coping strategies in response to those 
opportunities and constraints is the vital subsequent step.
Government restrictions on refugees’ right to work, on 
recognition of refugee certifi cates and diplomas, and on 
securing residence permits represent the biggest challen-
ges to refugee self-reliance and refugee protection in urban 
areas. Governments fail to recognize or acknowledge that 
without the legal right to work, refugees are forced to enter 
the gray market, which does not contribute to the tax base, 
or, alternatively, engage in criminal activities to survive. 
Even where refugees have the right to work, such as Uganda, 
the lack of coherent domestic legislation means that this is 
interpreted diff erently by diff erent government offi  cials and 
local employers thereby penalizing the refugees and imped-
ing their access to employment. Costs associated with secur-
ing work permits, residence permits and the translation of 
school transcripts and diplomas serve as barriers to refugee 
market access.
Building Assets
Th e fi eld assessments carried out by the Women’s Refugee 
Commission highlighted the importance of human, fi nan-
cial and especially social assets in urban refugees’ liveli-
hoods. Social networks not only assisted with access to 
housing and jobs but were a vital source of information 
about services and opportunities. Social networks also 
helped mitigate risks faced by refugees in these environ-
ments.67 Th ere is a need to recognize and support the vital 
role that these social networks play in urban refugees’ pro-
tection and survival. Such as through supporting indigen-
ous refugee mutual assistance organizations, capacitating 
informal refugee savings and loan mechanisms, working 
with and through refugee religious institutions, women’s 
groups, leadership structures and youth clubs.
Building human assets necessitates assisting refugees’ 
access educational and training opportunities. Identifying 
and focusing on which local vocational training programs 
serving host country nationals have job placement com-
ponents and the best post-training employment records, 
for example, and how these programs can be capacitated to 
serve the refugee population. Identifi cation of and facilitat-
ing access to existing business development services could 
build refugees’ fi nancial literacy and entrepreneurial skills. 
Building fi nancial capital requires assisting refugees access 
salaries, income, credit, and safe places to save. Assessing, 
for example, whether existing micro-fi nance institutions 
could be convinced to provide loans, safe places to save, and 
micro-insurance to the refugee population and what sup-
port this might require.
Creating Pathways
As referenced above, rather than creating parallel programs 
and services, focus should be on assisting refugees’ access 
existing services including those targeting the urban poor. 
Existing services have track records and understand the 
socio-economic context and local markets. Th is entails 
mapping current service providers for vocational train-
ing, business development services, job placement pro-
grams and micro-fi nance institutions and assessing their 
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strengths and their potential for extending services to the 
urban refugee populations. Th is may require further cap-
acitating through technical or funding support and it may 
require modifi cations in program models and approaches. 
Microfi nance institutions (MFIs), for example, exist in vir-
tually every refugee-impacted urban area serving the host 
country’s poor who face the same challenges and reside in 
the same neighborhoods as the urban refugees. MFIs have 
a myriad of products—savings, consumer loans, house-
hold loans, business loans and micro-insurance that can 
be tailored to the unique needs of the refugee population. 
An interview with the director of BRAC in Kampala, for 
example, indicated that they are willing and ready to extend 
their services to the refugee population.
While economic programming in urban environments is 
complex and local markets and opportunities are oft en lim-
ited, starting with and building on what exists both within 
the refugee populations and with the local economic ser-
vice providers would facilitate better practice and ultimately 
should lead to better outcomes.
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